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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
I.

Did the trial court err in concluding, on the facts

of this case, that Clark had no implied contractual duty to ensure
the Hormans* continued use and enjoyment of the parking rights
received under the contract which Clark had fully performed?
II.

Under the facts of this case, did the trial court

correctly determine that Clark, the grantor of an interest in real
property to Hormans, was not an insurer of Hormans' duty to record?

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a September 11, 1984 judgment
rendered after trial to the Honorable Bryant H. Croft of the Third
Judicial District Court wherein he found that Appellants ("Hormans")
had no cause of action against Respondent ("Clark") for breach of a
written contract to convey parking privileges to Hormans.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This suit arose out of an agreement between Clark and the
Hormans, who owned adjacent property, by which Clark conveyed to
Hormans parking rights on his property.

The Hormans failed to

record that conveyance in a timely manner, and their parking rights
were extinguished when Clark later conveyed the underlying parcel.
Both Hormans and Clark have been involved extensively in the real
estate industry for several decades, involving hundreds of real
estate transactions.

Trial Transcript 13-14 and 139-40.

1.

1975 Agreement.
In 1975, Hormans and Clark owned adjoining parcels of real

estate, zoned for commercial use, located at approximately 4500
South State Street in Salt Lake City, Utah (hereinafter referred to
respectively as the "Horman Property" and the "Clark Property").
Findings of Fact,

Record at 466.

By Agreement dated July 7, 1975

Hormans and Clark mutually agreed to convey a portion of their
properties to Murray City for the construction of a road which
would provide additional access to each property.

(This Agreement

shall hereinafter be referred to as the "Agreement".)

As part of

the Agreement Clark agreed to
permit Hormans or their assigns with parking
privileges for Hormans or Hormans' invitees or
assigns to park on the parking lot in the rear of
the Valley Shopping Center [Clark's property] in
any of the stalls which are used for public
parking.l
Findings of Fact 2-7, Record at 466-67; see also Exhibit 6-P.
The Agreement contained no other language imposing recordation or
other post-conveyance duties upon Clark.
2.

The 1978 Recordation Of The Agreement.
The format of the Agreement complied with Utah's recording

statutes and was a recordable document.

Duplicate originals of the

document were executed and each party kept one original.

Findings

*The Agreement was signed by Horman in September of 1975 and
by Clark in March of 1976, but was dated July 5, 1975. Thus, the
Agreement was effective and all rights thereunder conveyed on July
7, 1975.
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of Fact 10 and 12, Record at 468, The Agreement was not recorded
until January 12, 1978 when S.M. Horman, upon determining that it
had never been recorded, took his copy to the Salt Lake County
Recorder's Office and recorded it. Findings of Fact 13, Record at
468.

The uncontradicted expert testimony at trial showed that the

custom and practice in Utah is that the grantee of an interest in
property bears the burden of recording that interest so as to give
notice of his interest to others. Trial Transcript 307.
3.

1977 Sale By Clark Of Underlying Parcel.
On March 15, 1977, prior to the time the Agreement was

recorded, Clark agreed to convey his property to W. Weeks Wirthliri
and his wife in a six-party real estate exchange agreement
("Exchange Agreement").

The Exchange Agreement provided that the

Clark property would be conveyed subject to "encroachments,
easements and restrictions of record".

Exhibit 9-P.

Pursuant to

the Exchange Agreement, Clark provided a warranty deed conveying
the property to the Wirthlins and a preliminary title report
prepared by Associated Title Company showing good and marketable
title in Clark.

The warranty deed provided that the property was

subject to
easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of
way, encroachments and reservations appearing of
record or enforceable in law or equity.
Findings of Fact 14, 15 and 16, Record at 468-49, see also,
Exhibit 10-P.

No mention of the Agreement was made in the title

report because Hormans had not yet recorded it.

Findings of Fact

16, Record at 469. The title company handling the real estate

-3-

exchange recorded the warranty deed to the Wirthlins on March 15,
1977, approximately one year before Hormans recorded the
Agreement.

Findings of Fact 18, Record at 469.

Because the Wirthlins and their transferee, the Grandale
Finlayson Family Trust, took the property without notice of
Hormans* interest, they were bona fide purchasers for value, and
they obtained fee interest in the property unencumbered by Hormans1
parking interest.

Findings of Fact 19, Record at 469; see also,

Appellants Brief 9.
4.

Hormans' Subsequent Development of Their Property.
On or about July 1, 1980, S.M. Horman, Jr. obtained a

building permit for a strip shopping center on the Hormans1
property.

The building permit was obtained from Murray City upon

the representation that Hormans possessed a right to park on the
adjacent property formerly owned by Clark.

When it was learned

that Hormans did not have the right to park on the Clark Property,
Murray City reduced the amount of permitted occupiable space in the
strip mall.
5.

Findings of Fact 26, 27, 31 and 33, Record at 470-472.

Judicial Proceedings.
Horman brought suit against Clark and others for lost

profits and other damages resulting from the reduced occupancy.
The suit was based initially on claims of fraud, breach of an oral
contract, unjust enrichment, and breach of a written contract.
Record at 2-6, 65-66, 76-83, 111-112. At the time of trial, Clark
was the only remaining defendant and the only remaining claim was
breach of the written Agreement.

Record at 363-66, 372-73.
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After reviewing all of the evidence presented at trial,
the Honorable Bryant H. Croft, as the trier of fact, entered a
Memorandum Opinion holding that Hormans had no cause of action
against Clark for breach of the written agreement to convey parking
privileges.

Record at 462.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Agreement grants to Hormans the right "to park on the
parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any of the
stalls which are used for public parking", a right conveyed to
Hormans by Clark and enjoyed by Hormans from 1975 until March 1977
when the Wirthlins recorded their fee interest in the property.

By

granting Hormans the parking privileges, Clark fulfilled every
express obligation of the contract.
The implied duties for which Hormans contend —

a duty of

good faith dealing, a duty not to interfere with property rights, a
duty not to repudiate a contract, and a duty not to make performance impossible -- are duties intended to assure the completion of
the contract.

However, this contract was completed once Clark

granted Hormans the parking interest at which time all duties,
whether express or implied, were satisfied.

Clark did not have a

continuing contractual duty to protect the benefits or property
interest received by Hormans from subsequent defeasance.

That duty,

whether characterized as a duty to record or otherwise, rested with
Hormans and arose at the time they received the interest.

-5-

ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT CLARK HAD NO CONTINUING
IMPLIED CONTRACTUAL DUTIES TO HORMANS ONCE HE COMPLETED THE
CONTRACT BY GRANTING HORMANS THE PARKING PRIVILEGE.
Hormans* tried the case on a single cause of action in

the Fourth Amended Complaint for breach of the written Agreement.
In that Fourth Amended Complaint, Hormans specifically allege that
Clark breached the Agreement in two ways:
1) Defendant failed to disclose the existence
of the agreement . . . to the new purchasers and
failed to list the interest of the plaintiffs on
the Warranty Deed conveying the property to the
said third party purchasers.
2) Defendant •interfere[ed] with the parking
rights previously granted to Plaintiffs.*
Fourth Amended Complaint II 6, Record at 364.
The Agreement grants to Hormans the right "to park on the
parking lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any
of the stalls which are used for public parking."2

Hormans admit

this parking right was granted to them in complete compliance with
the terms of the Agreement:
Such property right was a valid property
interest and properly conveyed to plaintiffs by
written document dated and signed on the 7th of
July, 1975.
Record at 396 (emphasis added); see also, Fourth Amended Complaint,
If 3.

Record at 363-64,

Thus, Hormans possessed and enjoyed this

2

Horman contends that the Parking Agreement constitutes an
easement rather than a revocable license. Appellant's Brief 7-9
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Record at 396 (emphasis added); see also, Fourth Amended Complaint,
1f 3.

Record at 363-64,

Thus, Hormans possessed and enjoyed this

parking privilege from the date of the Agreement until March 1977,
when the purchasers of the shopping center received and recorded
their fee interest to the underlying shopping center land.
Since Clark completed the contract by performing every
express term of the Parking Agreement, Hormans necessarily seek to
impose liability on Clark by implying covenants in the Agreement
regarding Clark's duties after performance of that contract.
A.

The Existence Of Implied Terms In A Contract Is An Issue
Of Law.
The interpretation or construction of a contract is a

question of law.

E.g., Morris v. Mountain States Telephone &

Telegraph Company, 658 P.2d 1199, 1200 (Utah 1983).

Thus, whether

the Agreement contains the implied terms or duties for which
Hormans contend is a question of law as applied to the facts which
the trial court found.
B.

Implied Contractual Duties Or Conditions Are Not Favored
In Law.
Implied conditions are not favored in the law, e.g.,

2

Continued: However, the basis for the trial court's decision
made it unnecessary to resolve this issue. Record at 473-75. As
correctly argued in Appellant's Brief, whether an agreement creates
an easement or a revocable license depends on the parties' intent,
and intent is a question of fact. It would thus be inappropriate
for this Court to rule that the agreement created an easement, as
requested by Appellant, which issue should be remanded for a factual
determination of the parties' intent in the event of a reversal of
the trial court's decision. Compare, Trial Transcript 21 with,
Trial Transcript 121-22.
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Fuller Market Basket, Inc. v. Gillinqham & Jones, Inc., 14 Wash.
App. 128, 539 P.2d 868, 872 (1975), particularly when the implied
term would result in a breach, e.g. , Smith v. Long, 40 Colo. App.
531, 578 P.2d 232, 235 (1978).

Thus,

[b]ecause of the reluctance of courts to tamper
with parties* written contracts, certain
conditions have been imposed before a court will
imply a covenant. These conditions have been
summarized as:
(1) The implication must arise from the
language used . . .; (2) it must appear from the
language used that it was so clearly within the
contemplation of the parties that they deemed it
unnecessary to express it; (3) implied covenants
can only be justified on the grounds of legal
necessity; (4) a promise can be implied only
where it can be rightfully assumed that it would
have been made if attention had been called to
it; (5) there can be no implied covenant where
the subject is completely covered in the contract.
Walgreen Arizona Drug Co. v. Plaza Center Corp., 132 Ariz. 512, 647
P.2d 643, 646 (1982); accord, Brown v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 94
Wash.2d 354, 617 P.2d 704, 710-11 (1980).
C.

There Was No Implied Contractual Duty To List The Parking
Agreement In A Warranty Deed Or To Disclose It To Subsequent
Purchasers.
No duty or covenant for Clark to list specifically the

existence of the Agreement in his Warranty Deed for the entire
shopping center property or to disclose its existence to subsequent
purchasers can be implied in the Agreement for several reasons.
First, there is no express language in the Agreement from
which such "implication must arise".
v. Plaza Center Corp., supra.

See Walgreen Arizona Drug Co.

Moreover, it does not "appear from
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the language used [in the Agreement] that it was so clearly within
the contemplation of the parties that they deemed it unnecessary to
express" Clark's purported duty to disclose the Agreement to
subsequent purchasers of the shopping center property.

There is

simply nothing in the language or meaning of the Agreement to
suggest the implied duties for which Hormans argue.
Second, there is no legal necessity here for the asserted
implied duties.

As discussed below, the recording statutes as well

as custom and practice in Utah assign such duties to the buyer or
recipient, see Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953); Trial Transcript
307, and if Hormans had recorded, disclosure by Clark to the
Wirthlins would have been meaningless.

Hormans argue for such

duties by raising the spectre of fraudulent reconveyances of the
same property.

However, that argument fails because this case does

not involve such a duplicate conveyance and because such fraudulent
reconveyances are protected against by the tort laws.3

Indeed,

Hormans seek a judicial rescue from their own recording failure by
asking the court to write new terms and duties into its contract.
But it is well settled that contracts should not be rewritten by
courts to include terms addressed to such possibilities.4

3

Horman stipulated to the dismissal of the claims based upon
fraud, unjust enrichment and breach of an oral contract. Record at
372-73; compare Fourth Amended Complaint, Record at 363-366, with
Third amended Complaint, Record at 111-12.
4

Courts should not rewrite contracts more favorable to one
party than those contracts the parties themselves agree upon. "A
court will not enforce asserted rights that are not supported by the
contract itself." Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505
(Utah 1980) .
-9-

Third, there is simply no statutory or case law authority
supporting the implied terms for which Hormans contend.

That

paucity of precedent is due to the radical departure of Hormans'
contention:

Even the covenants implied in warranty deeds do not

extend as far as the duties Hormans seek to impose upon Clark,
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1953).

See

Here the parties used a written

agreement with no warranties; Hormans simply received the parking
rights for which they bargained.
D.

Any Implied Duty Not To Interfere With The Performance
of a Contract Does Not Extend To The Facts Of This Case.
Similarly, the alleged implied duty to deal in good faith

or not to interfere with Horman's parking rights must be analyzed
in terms of its proposed application in this case.

Hormans argue

that Clark's "obligation of fair dealing and good faith resulted in
the obligation of permitting Horman parking privileges".
Appellant's Brief 12.
the parking privileges.
363-64

But Hormans admit that Clark fully conveyed
Fourth Amended Complaint 1f 3, Record at

Thus, Clark met Hormans' test of good faith when he

granted fully the parking rights.
The only "interference" which Hormans really allege is
that, after fully granting the parking rights to Hormans, Clark
conveyed the underlying land to a third party.

Hormans call that

transfer an "interference" because it indirectly resulted in
Hormans' loss of the parking rights, a loss resulting because the
Agreement was not recorded.

Thus, Hormans' theory would require

Clark or any seller, before he could transfer fee simple to
-10-

property, to check or ensure that any lesser interest in the land
was recorded.

There is simply no authority for such a revolutionary

shift of burdens in real estate conveyances in this state.

See

Trial Transcript 306-09 and 312.
Hormans attempt to muster supporting case law authority,
but none of their cases applies factually or legally.

Hormans

primarily, if not exclusively, rely on cases dealing with a party
who fails to complete performance of a contract by voluntarily
making his performance impossible.5

Those cases would apply here

only if Clark had not conveyed the parking rights in the first
place.

However, where, as here, the interest was fully conveyed

and the buyer thereafter asserts an implied, continuing duty on the
seller to record the interest or to specifically disclose it to a
subsequent third party purchaser, the cited cases have no relevant
teaching.
In a separate effort to overcome the adverse law, Hormans
try to recast the case by characterizing Clark's position as
follows:

5

The nine cases cited by Hormans which turn on a failure of
initial performance are: Tanner v. Baadsgaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah 1979); Dillon v. Morgan, 362
So. 1130 (La. App. 1978); Mohr v. Sears, 239 Or. 41, 395 P.2d 117
(1964). Cannon v. Stevens School of Business, Inc., 560 P.2d 1381
(Utah 1977); Marlowe Investment Corp. v. Radmall, 26 Utah 2d 124,
1980); 485 P.2d 1402 (1971); Thompson v. Thompson, 1 Wash. App.
196, 460 P.2d 679 (1969); Zogarts v. Smith, 86 Cal. App. 2d 165,
194 P.2d 143 (1948); Pacific Venture Corp. v. Huey, 15 Cal.2d 711,
104 P.2d 641 (1940) .
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Respondent now argues that . . . Appellant's
failure to record voided the contract, thereby
enabling him to sell the property to another party.
Appellant's Brief, 13. This "strawman" argument misstates Clark's
position.

Clark contends that Hormans* failure to record the

Agreement ultimately resulted in an extinguishment of their parking
right, but did not void the Agreement with Clark because that
Agreement had already been completed and fully performed.

The

Agreement is not void even though the parking right was lost by
Hormans.
Hormans also argue that Clark is precluded from transferring the same interest or "granting two conflicting interests.?
Appellent's Brief, 12 and 15. However, Clark clearly did not sell
the same property or the same interest successively nor did he
grant two conflicting interests.

In 1977, Clark sold the

underlying shopping center parcel; he did not sell the same parking
rights he granted to Hormans.

The situation where two successive

sales of identical property are made is dramatically different,
since such duplicate sales are inherently inconsistent.
case, defrauded buyers may have a claim for fraud.

In such a

Here, however,

and in a multitude of real property transactions, the grant of a
lesser estate such as the parking right and the later conveyance of
the underlying parcel are neither inconsistent nor conflicting.
Indeed, under Hormans* theory of conflicting transfers, a property
owner should never convey his property if he had previously granted
a lesser interest, such as an easement or license or lease.
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The case of Pearson v. Shadix, 237 Ga. 817, 229 S.E.2d 653
(Ga. 1976), cited by Hormans is not relevant for precisely this
reason.

That Pearson case involved a boundary dispute between two

lot owners in a subdivision where their respective deeds granted
overlapping land.

The Georgia court held for the lot owner who

received his deed first, noting the developer "cannot thereafter
convey legal title to the same land to another grantee."
654 (emphasis added).

Id., at

The instant case does not involve conveyances

of fee simple to two identical pieces of land.

Indeed, but for

Hormans' failure to record, there was and is nothing inconsistent
or conflicting in separately granting an easement and then later
conveying the underlying property.
The weakness of Hormans1 argument can be seen by examining
the case of Johnson v. Bell, 666 P.2d 308 (Utah 1983), which
Hormans proclaim to be "excellent authority for [their] position."
Appellant's Brief, 15.

In Johnson, plaintiffs sought to quiet

title to certain property or to recover damages against the Bells.
In 1966, Mr. Bell executed an installment contract with plaintiffs'
predecessors in interest and also gave to them a quitclaim deed on
an adjoining 80 acres.
from a tax sale.

In 1967, plaintiffs redeemed the 80 acres

On September 9, 1974, the Bells executed a trust

deed to Murray First Thrift on the 80 acres.

Two weeks later the

plaintiffs for the first time recorded the 1966 quitclaim deed to
the 80 acres.

Jd. at 309.

Even though the same land had been conveyed twice, the
Supreme Court rejected plaintiffs claims for damages against the
-13-

Bells because the "quitclaim deed carried [no] warranty of title"
and because "plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with the
Id.

Bells and no contractual liability is present".

at 312,

Hormans' arguments from the Johnson case fail on two grounds.
First, Hormans mischaracterize the holding in Johnson when they
state that:
The Court recognized a contractual cause of
action between the original grantor and the
original grantee. It is this contractual cause
of action upon which Plaintiffs' claim is based.
Appellants' Brief, 15.

The Court in Johnson only held that:

If any cause of action for damages exists
against Bell because of breach of some contractual
duty, such cause of action would be owned by the
original grantees and not by plaintiffs.
Johnson at 666 P.2d at 312 (emphasis added).

Thus, the Johnson

Court explicitly did not recognize any such cause of action, such
a holding not being necessary.

Second, and more importantly, the

Johnson case involved the crucially different fact of a double
conveyance of the same property -- and not, as here, conveyance of
different and non-conflicting property interests.
II.

CLARK HAD NO DUTY, CONTRACTUAL OR OTHERWISE, TO ENSURE
THAT HORMANS WOULD RECORD THE PARKING AGREEMENT.
Hormans' argument depends on a mischaracterization of the

trial court's conclusion of law that Hormans' failure to record
relieved Clark of any contractual obligations.
9-10.

Appellants' Brief,

However, the trial court held that the contractual duties

sought to be imposed on Clark by Hormans do not exist, and
recognized the protective effect the recording statutes would have
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afforded Hormans had they recorded the Agreement.

The Court did

not relieve Clark of any contractual duties because all relevant
duties had been performed.
Notice to subsequent purchasers is given by the recording
statute.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953).

Any implied duty to

record is on the buyer - the Hormans in this case.

"[P]arties who

contract on subject matter concerning which known usages prevail
incorporate into the agreement such implications if nothing is said
to the contrary."

Engle v. First National Bank of Chugwater, 590

P.2d 826, 831 (Wyo. 1979).

The unquestioned practice concerning

recording is that "the recipient of an instrument of conveyance
. . . takes it to the office of the proper recording agency" to be
recorded.

6A Powell on Real Property 82-35 (1984); This practice

was recognized as early as 1833 and has not been questioned since.
Adams v. Cuddy, 30 Mass. 460 (1833).

The expert testimony at trial

was that in Utah the grantee of an interest records.

Trial

Transcript 307.
Hormans lost their parking interest because they failed to
record.

They cannot escape this loss by attempting to create a

wholly new implied contractual duty on Clark.
National Bank of Chugwater, 590 P.2d at 830.

Cf. Engle v. First
Since the law assumes

that grantees will record their interests in real property, and the
custom and practice in Utah is for grantees to record interests in
real property, Clark had a right to assume that Hormans had
recorded their interest.

The obligation for which Hormans argue

would dramatically change the custom and practice in Utah (see
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Record at 798-800), and impose on vendors of real property not only
the burden of monitoring forever any interests or potential
interests in numerous properties even though the vendor's only
promise was to convey a certain interest, but would make the vendor
an insurer against the recipient's failure to record,

CONCLUSION
There is no basis in law or under the facts of this case
for the requested and radical rule of law shifting from Hormans to
Clark the responsibility for continued protection of the benefits
received by Hormans in full compliance with the Agreement.

Contract

law should not be altered to provide Hormans such additional
protections not agreed to by the parties, particularly when the
potential evils decried by Hormans are protected against by the
laws of fraud and tort.

Thus, the September 11, 1984 Judgment of

Judge Croft should be affirmed,7
DATED this fjM

day of May 1985.

James &\ Jardine
Craig/£arlile
Attorneys for Respondent

7

Appellants request this Court to order the "Trial Court to
enter a money judgment in favor of the Appellants based upon the
evidence at trial". Appellants' Brief 2. The evidence of damages
is in sharp conflict. Compare, Trial Transcript, 156-159 with
Trial Transcript 323-27 and Trial Transcript 371-82. Before any
money judgment could be entered, the trial court would first have
to find that Appellants suffered a loss which could not have been
mitigated. Thus, if this Court finds some error in the trial
court's findings or conclusions, remand is the proper remedy in
view of the evidentiary issues which would then remain.
-16-

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on the fJ*

day of May, 1985, four

copies of the foregoing Respondent's Brief were mailed, postage
prepaid, in the United States mails to Raymond A. Hintze, 4685
Highland Drive, Suite 202, Salt Lake City, Utah

T/C*#

[4546i]

84117.

/AA:/^

ADDENDUM

NLMfcU
nr:
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL ^ S T R I C T
x

IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH —

S. M. HORMAN, as General
Partner for Horman
Construction Co., a Utah
Partnership and S. M.
Horman, Jr.,

MEMORANDUM DECISION
CIVIL NO. C-81-2129

Plaintiffs,
vs .
S. SPENCE CLARK, as General
Partner for Valley Shopping
Center Associates, a Utah
Partnership,
Defendants.

This case came on for trial before the Court on July 9, and 10,
1984 with Raymond A. Hintze appearing as counsel for plaintiff,
and James S. Jardine appearing as counsel for defendant-

At the

conclusion of the trial the Court took its decision under advisement
and having considered the same, now renders its decision thereon.
The case was filed on March 16, 1981 and was tried upon the
issues arising out of the Fourth Amended Complaint filed February 24,
1984, upon facts which may be summarized as follows:
Plaintiffs were owners of a tract of land lying north of and
continguous to the Valley Shopping Center owned by defendant and
located at the northeast corner of the intersection of 4500 South and
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State Streets in Murray, Utah.
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Defendant had acquired the shoppinc

center from Horman in about 1970.

The tract of land xwned by

plaintiffs was vacant property being held by plaintiffs for future
development.
Being desirous of obtaining a break in the traffic control
island along State Street to afford access to the center by
southbound traffic, the defendant determined that it could do so
only by dedicating land for construction of a road from State Stre<
eastward to Fairbourne Avenue.

Defendant thus commenced negotiate

with Horman for a conveyance of a portion of their respective
parcels of land to Murray City for construction of said roadway.
These negotiations culminated in the execution of an agreement
between plaintiff and defendant dated July 5, 1975, but which was
not signed by S. M. Horman for the Construction Company until
September, 1975, and was not signed by defendant until March, 1976
Both signatures were acknowledged before a notary public.
The agreement provided that Horman would deed to Murray City
the south 35 feet of its parcel of land running east and west for
about 460 feet and that defendant would deed to Murray City the
north 15 feet of its shopping center land from State Street
to Fairbourne Street; that defendant would obtain a deed from
American Motors to Murray City of the south 35 feet of its propert
fronting on State Street and contiguous to Horman's parcel on the
west, (about 150 feet in length) and that Horman would not be

HORMAN, ET AL V.
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required to pave the street.
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The agreement also contained the

following provision:
It is understood between both parties
hereto that Property Management and/or
Valley Shopping Center Assoc, will permit
Horman or its assigns with parking
privileges for Horman or Horman invitees
or assigns to park on the parking lot in
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center
in any of the stalls which are used for
public parking.
The agreement contained a legal description of the shopping center
property.
Both parties had a signed and notarized copy of the agreement.
However, upon final execution of the agreement neither party had
the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's office and it
remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978, when S. M. Horman came
upon the agreement m

his files and took it to the Recorder's

office where, upon determining that it had never been recorded,
he then recorded it.
However, on March 15, 1977, a real estate exchange agreement
was executed by six parties, namely, Sterling Furniture, Modern
Enterprises, W. Meeks Wirthlm and wife, Provswood, Auerbachs
and defendant by which defendant agreed to and did convey its
interest in the Valley Shopping Center to the Wirthlms, subject
only to a first mortgage ($423,329), to a mortgage to Murray City
that secured defendant's obligation to pave the street, and to
"encroachments, easements and restrictions of record."

The

agreement required defendant to deposit by March 15, 1977 a

455
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preliminary title report by Associated Title Co. showing good and
marketable title in Valley and a warranty deed conveying the
Center to the Wirthlins.

This requirement was met and the warrant'

deed contained the provision that the property was subject, among
other things, to "easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of wa
encroachments and reservations appearing of record or enforceable
in law or equity."
Since the agreement between plaintiff and defendant had not
been recorded as of March 15, 1977, and was not recorded until
March 12, 1978, as stated supra, no mention thereof was made
in the title report.

The agreement of March 15, 1977, reserved

$46,000 from the funds to be paid to defendant to cover the cost
of paving the roadway to be built upon the land conveyed to Murray
City, and which was in fact constructed and completed.
The warranty deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on March 15,
1977 by the title company handling the real estate exchange.
Thereafter the Wirthlins sold their interest in Valley Shopping
Center to Arnold Development who in turn sold it to G. G. Finlaysoi
and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at the time of trial.
At the time Horman recorded the agreement between the parties
in March, 1978, he made no inquiry as to the then ownership status
and thus did not know of the sale of the center by defendant to the
Wirthlins.

In 1980 the Horman property was conveyed to S. M.

Horman, Jr., as trustee for his family and he then undertook to
develop the property for business purposes.
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Horman, Jr., obtained a building permit from Murray City
about July 1, 1980, and commenced to build the outside walls with
the intent to complete 20 interior units as lessees were obtained
so each leased unit could be installed and completed in accordance
with the desires of each lessee.

The building permit records of

Murray City left something to be desired, but minutes of a
commission meeting dated May 1, 1980 reflected that Horman had
explained that off-street parking for his building would be provided
on a lot located on the south side of 4370 South Street, the
street built pursuant to the agreement between the parties.
As Horman proceeded with the construction of the building
the difficulty leading to the filing of this lawsuit began to
take shape when Finalyson learned in some way of the apparent
parking easement which resulted in a letter by his attorney
dated September 30, 1980, to Arnold Development requesting an
adjustment in the purchase price because of the reported easement.
A copy of this letter was designated for Horman Construction Co.
On November 17, 1980 Finlayson's lawyer wrote a letter to Horman
Construction attaching a copy of a letter written by Associated
Title Co. dated November 3, 1980, which expressed the view that
because of the late recording of the agreement between plaintiff
and defendant, any easement for parking granted therein was
ineffective against the Wirthlins and the subsequent purchasers.
By letter dated December 30, 1980, S. M. Horman responded thereto

45?
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and continued to assert the easement was valid and discussed

m

detail the problems that would arise should the Horman business
development

lose its parking spaces.

In the months that followed Murray City issued a stop order
on the construction; building plans were altered and off-street
parking spaces were constructed on the Horman property but these
were about 22 spaces short of meeting the Murray City ordinance
requirements for parking; negotiations were undertaken by the
Hormans with Fmlayson to obtain spaces in the center; and leases
were let based upon Murray City's approval of interior constructio
for a 57% occupancy.

The negotiations for parking in the center's

parking lot between plaintiffs and defendant did not result in a
successful conclusion so this lawsuit was filed March 16, 1981, an
at the time of trial the occupancy allowance remained the same
and the negotiations between Horman and Fmlayson were still
being pursued as they had been during the prior 3% years.
Amended pleadings were filed from time to time resulting in
a dismissal of the case against the Wirthlms, Arnold, Fmlayson
and Griffin.

The filing of the Fourth Amended Complaint upon whic

the case was tried was stipulated to upon the plaintiffs dropping
their claims for relief based upon prior allegations of fraud and
breach of an alleged oral promise by defendant's agent that he
would record the agreement.

The claims for relief set forth in th

Fourth Amended Complaint were for an alleged breach of the agreeme
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between the parties in that defendant (1) failed to disclose the
existence of the agreement to new purchasers and (2) failed to
specifically mention the Horman interest in the center's property
on the warranty deed conveying the property to the Wirthlins,
thereby allegedly breaching defendant's contractual duty not to
interfere with the parking rights granted under that agreement.
It was alleged that refusal by subsequent owners to allow parking
privileges resulted in damages of lost rents and a diminution
in the value of plaintiffs1 property.
Much evidence and testimony were presented during the trial
relating to construction problems, to negotiations for parking
spaces, efforts with Murray City to obtain variances including
even a vacating of the street, and to damages.

But the significant

factual issue centered around the alleged breach of a contractual
duty not to interfere with the parking rights under the contract.
The warranty deed by which defendant conveyed the shopping
center property to the Wirthlins contained provisions that the
conveyance was subject to the first mortgage, the performance
mortgage to Murray City (also to a right of way over the north
15 feet which was the parcel deeded to Murray City for roadway
purposes), and to "easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of
way, encroachments and reservations appearing of record or enforceable in law or equity."

Plaintiffs assert that the failure to

specifically set out in that deed that the conveyance was also
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subject to the parking privileges under the contract was a breach
of duty not to interfere.
The agreement had all the necessary requirements for
recording —

acknowledged signatures and property description --

and it is thus readily apparent that had Horman recorded the
agreement in March, 1976, after Clark signed it for defendant,
it would have constituted notice to all that the contracted for
parking rights were an encumbrance upon the property and would have
been included in the provisions of the quoted language set forth
in the preceding paragraph.

Horman has had long experience in

the acquisition, construction, management, sales and leasing of
real property and to him the necessity of recording the agreement
to protect his interest in the parking facilities at the center
must have been well known to him and understood by him.
done so, this lawsuit would never have been filed.

Had he

Having failed

to do so, can plaintiffs now shift the responsiblity to defendant
for the problems and damages that followed?
While it may be true as alleged by plaintiffs that defendant
had a duty not

"to interfere" with the contractual rights of

the plaintiffs, neither the sale of the property by defendant
nor defendant's failure to either itself record the agreement
nor to specifically mention the encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlir
constitutes an interference with plaintiffs1 contract rights.
The fact that the Wirthlins were bona fide purchasers for value
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without notice of the unrecorded contract was the determining
factor in precluding plaintiffs from retaining the parking privileges
provided for in the contract.
I find no duty upon the defendant to have recorded the
agreement.

In real estate transactions, it is a grantee's rights

that are given protection by the recording statutes and that
protection can only be obtained by the recording.

I think the

responsibility for doing so falls upon the grantee and such has
long been the practice in real estate transactions.

The law

neither requires nor is it customary that a warranty deed conveying
real property specifically list all of the valid, existing encumbrances
of record.

That is why title companies exist and that is why

buyers and sellers both look to title reports to reveal such
encumbrances of record.
There is no evidence in this case that defendant knew
the agreement with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant
entered into the six-sided real estate exchange agreement under
which defendant sold to the Wirthlins, nor is there any convincing
evidence that defendant knowingly or intentionally failed to
disclose the parking privilege encumbrance when that real estate
exchange agreement was negotiated.

As stated supra, both the

exchange agreement and the warranty deed to the Wirthlins contained
provisions that would have preserved the parking privilege had
Horman promptly recorded the agreement.

Plaintiffs abandoned

their prior claim that defendant breached an oral agreement to
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record the agreement and indeed there was no implied duty to do so
nor any obligation to make certain that Horman had done so.
I thus find no breach of duty by defendant under the agreemen
and must enter a verdict against the plaintiffs and in favor of
the defendant of no cause of action.

Having so ruled, the issue

of damages need not be further considered.
Counsel for defendant shall prepare appropriate Findings,
Conclusions and Judgment unless the parties by written Stipulatior
otherwise agree as provided in Rule 52(c).
Dat ed this

£-5"

"day of July, 1984.

BRYANT tiJ. CROFT •
DISTRICT JUDGE (Retired)
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JAMES S. JARDINE (A1647) and
CRAIG CARLILE (0571) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendant
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 3850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-3850
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
S. M. HORMAN, as General
Partner for Horman Construction
Co., a Utah partnership and
S. M. HORMAN, JR.,

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
v.
S. SPENCE CLARK, as General
Partner for Valley Shopping
Center Associates, a Utah
partnership,

Civil No.

C-81-2129

Defendants.
ooOoo
This matter came on before the Court for trial without a
jury on July 9, 10 and 11, 1984.

The plaintiff was represented by

Raymond A. Hintze and the defendant was represented by James S.
Jardine.
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The Court having considered the evidence, pleadings and
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oral arguments submitted by the parties, and having entered a
Memorandum Decision, the Court makes the following Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

In 1970, defendant acquired from S. M. Horman the

Valley Shopping Center located at the northeast corner of the
intersection of 4500 South and State Streets in Murray, Utah.
Plaintiff retained an undeveloped tract of land lying north of anc
contiguous to the Valley Shopping Center.
2.

In 1975, defendant petitioned Murray City to make a

median cut in the traffic control island along State Street at
4370 South to afford access to the Valley Shopping Center by
southbound traffic.
3.

Murray City agreed to make the requested median cut

only if defendant, plaintiff, and American Motors Company would
all dedicate portions of their property for the construction of a
road from State Street eastward to Fairbourne Avenue.
4.

Defendant commenced negotiations with Horman and

American Motors Company for a conveyance of a portion of their
respective parcels of land to Murray City for the construction of
said roadway.
5.

The negotiations between plaintiff and defendant

culminated in the execution of an agreement between plaintiff and
defendant entitled "Parking Agreement"
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6.

The "Parking Agreement" contained the following

provision:
It is understood between both parties hereto
that Property Management and/or Valley Shopping
Center Assoc, will permit Horman or its assigns
with parking privileges for Horman or Horman
invitees or assigns to park on the parking lot in
the rear of the Valley Shopping Center in any of
the stalls which are used for public parking.
The agreement contained a legal description of the shopping center
property.
7.

The "Parking Agreement" was dated July 5, 1975, but

was not signed by S. M. Horman for Horman Construction Company
until September, 1975, and was not signed by defendant until
March, 1976.

Both signatures were acknowledged before a notary

public.
8.

The Agreement provided that Horman would deed to

Murray City the south 35 feet of their parcel of land running east
and west for about 460 feet and that defendant would deed to
Murray City the north 15 feet of its property located between
State Street and Fairbourne Avenue.

American Motors Company

agreed to deed the south 35 feet of its property running on State
Street and contiguous to Horman's parcel on the west for about 150
feet.

Murray City ageed to make the requested median cut in the

traffic control island located on State Street.
9.

Part of the agreement whereby all parties deeded land

to Murray City included a provision that the Hormans would not be
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required to pave the street running from State Street to
Fairbourne Avenue.
10.

Both plantiff and defendant had a signed and

notarized copy of the "Parking Agreement".
11.

Plaintiffs received everything agreed to in the

Parking Agreement, and^styoyed the right to park on Valley Shoppinc
Center property up until the time they were defeased of such
rights through the recording of the Warranty Deed by W. Meeks
Wirthlin, a bona fide purchaser.
12.

The Parking Agreement was a recordable document

under Utah Law and had all the necessary requirements for
recording.
13.

Upon final execution of the agreement, neither part]

had the agreement recorded in the County Recorder's Office and it
remained unrecorded until January 12, 1978 when S. M. Horman took
his copy to the Salt Lake County Recorder's office where, upon
determining that it had never been recorded, he then recorded it.
14.

On March 15, 1977, prior to the time the Parking

Agreement was recorded by S. M. Horman, a Real Estate Exchange
Agreement was executed by six parties, namely, Sterling Furniture,
Modern Enterprises, W. Meeks Wirthlin and wife, Prowswood,
Auerbachs and defendant, by which defendant agreed to and did
convey its interest in the Valley Shopping Center to the
Wirthlins, subject only to a first mortgage in an amount of
$423,329.00, to a mortgage to Murray City that secured defendant's
-4-
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obligation to pave the street, and subject to "encroachments,
easements and restrictions of record."

The six party "exchange

agreement required defendant to provide by March 15, 1977, a
preliminary title report by Associated Title Companpy showing good
and marketable title in Valley Shopping Center and a Warranty Deed
conveying the center to the Wirthlins.
15.

Defendant complied with the requirement to obtain

and provide a preliminary title report and a Warranty Deed.
16.

The Warranty Deed contained the provision that the

property was subject, among other

things, to "easements,

covenants, restrictions, rights of way, encroachments and
reservations appearing of record or enforceable in law or
equity".

No mention of the Parking Agreement was made in the

title report because it had not been recorded as of March 15,
1977, the date of the title report.
17.

The six party exchange agreement of March 15, 1977,

reserved $46,000.00 from the funds to be paid to the defendant to
cover the costs of paving the roadway running from State Street
eastward to Fairbourne Avenue which had been conveyed to Murray
City.

The roadway was constructed and completed.
18.

The Warranty Deed to the Wirthlins was recorded on

March 15, 1977 by the title company handling the real estate
exchange.
19.

The Wirthlins were bona fide purchasers for value

without notice of the unrecorded contract.
•5-

20.

There is no evidence that defendant knew the Parking

Agreement with plaintiff had not been recorded when defendant
entered into the six party real estate exchange agreement under
which defendant sold the Valley Shopping Center to the Wirthlins.
21.

There is no convincing evidence that defendant

knowingly or intentionally failed to disclose the parking
privilege granted in the Parking Agreement when the real estate
exchange agreement was negotiated.
22.

The Wirthlins subsequently sold their interest in

the Valley Shopping Center to Arnold Development who in turn sold
it to G. G. Finlayson and Janet F. Griffin who owned the center at
the time of trial.
23.

At the time Horman recorded the Parking Agreement on

January 12, 1978, he made no inquiry as to the ownership status
and thus did not know of the sale of the center by defendant to
the Wirthlins.
24.

In 1980, the Horman property was conveyed to S. M.

Horman, Jr., as trustee for his family.
25.

Subsequent to receiving the subject property as

trustee for his family, S. M. Horman, Jr. undertook to develop the
property for business purposes.
26.

On or about July 1, 1980, S. M. Horman, Jr. obtained

a building permit from Murray City for a strip shopping center and
commenced to build the outside walls with the intention to
complete 20 interior units as leases were obtained so that each
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leased unit could be installed and completed in accordance with
the desires of each lessee.
27.

The minutes of a Murray City commission meeting

dated May 1, 1980 reflect that Horman had explained that off
street parking for his building would be provided on the Valley
Shopping Center property.
28.

Sometime prior to September 30, 1980, Mr. Finlayson

learned of Mr. Hormon's asserted parking easement on the Valley
Shopping Center property.
attorney for G. G.

On September 30, 1980, Rick D. Higgins,

Finlayson, wrote a letter to Arnold

Development requesting an adjustment in the purchase price of the
Valley Shopping Center because of Mr. Horman's alleged right to
park on Valley Shopping Center property.

A copy of this letter

was sent to Horman Construction Company.
29.

On November 17, 1980, Mr. Higgins wrote a letter on

behalf of Mr. Finlayson to Horman Construction Company, attaching
a copy of a letter written by Associated Title Company dated
November 3, 1980, which expressed the view that because of the
late recording of the agreement between plaintiff and defendant,
any right for parking granted therein was ineffective against the
Wirthlins and subsequent purchasers.
30.

On December 30, 1980, S. M. Horman, Jr., wrote in

response to Mr. Higgins' letter of November 17, 1980. That letter
continued to assert that the parking rights were valid and
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discussed in detail the problems that would arise should the
r

Horman business development lose its parking spaces.'-'
31.

In April, 1981, Murray City issued a stop order on

the construction of the strip center.
32.

As a result of the stop order, Mr. Horman altered

the building plans and made provisions for off street parking
spaces on the property owned by him.

However, the Horman property

was approximately 22 parking spaces short of meeting the Murray
City ordinance parking requirements for a building the size being
constructed.
33.
the building.

In August, 1981, Murray City issued 70% occupancy of
However, based on correspondence from Mr. Horman

which mistakenly computed his parking spaces, Murray City approved
57% occupancy of the building based upon the available parking
spaces.
34.

The Hormans entered into negotiations with the

Finlaysons beginning in December, 1980, for parking in the Valley
Shopping Center's parking lot.
35.

At the time of trial the 59% occupancy allowance

granted by Murray City remained the same and the negotiations
between Horman and Finlayson were still being pursued.
36.

Horman has had long experience in the acquisition,

construction, management, sales and leasing of real property and
to him the necessity of recording the agreement to protect his
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interest in the parking facilities at the Valley Shopping Center
must have been well known and understood.
37.

It is the custom and practice in real estate

transactions that the grantee record the instrument granting him
rights, titles and interest in real property.
38.

It is not the custom or practice that a warranty

deed conveying real property specifically list all of the valid,
existing encumbrances of record.
39.

Pursuant to a stipulation permitting the filing

of the Fourth Amended Complaint upon which the case was tried,
plaintiffs dismissed their claims alleging fraud and breach of an
alleged oral promise by defendant's agent that he would record the
agreement.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The claims for relief set forth in the Fourth Amended

Complaint were for an alleged breach of an implied contractual
covenant to (1) disclose the existence of the Parking Agreement to
the Wirthlins and (2) to specifically mention the Horman interest
in the center's property on the Warranty Deed conveying the
property to the Wirthlins.

Plaintiff alleges that these two

breaches constitute a violation of defendant's contractual duty
not to interfere with the parking rights granted by the Parking
Agreement.
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2.

Defendant complied with every express covenant in the

Parking Agreement.
3.

It is the custom and practice in real estate

transactions that the grantee record the instrument granting him
rights, title and interest in real property.
4.

Defendant had no duty to record the Parking Agreement

5.

The responsibility for recording falls upon Horman,

who was the grantee.
6.

In real estate transactions, it is the grantee's

rights that are given protection by the recording statutes and
that protection can only be obtained by recording the instrument.
7.

The real estate exchange agreement and the Warranty

Deed from defendant to the Wirthlins contained provisions that
would have preserved the parking privilege had Horman promptly
recorded the Parking Agreement.
8.

The law does not require that a warranty deed

conveying real property specifically list all of the valid,
existing encumbrances of record.
9.

There was no implied duty in the Parking Agreement

for defendant to record that agreement.
10.

Defendant did not breach any duty under the Parking

Agreement, including but not limited to the duty not to interfere
with rights granted by the agreement.
11.

The sale of the property by defendant did not

constitute an interference with plaintiff's contract right.
\N nriNXKY
\
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12.

Defendant's failure to record the parking agreement

did not constitute an interference with plaintiff's contract
rights.
13.

Defendant's failure to mention specifically the

parking agreement encumbrance in its deed to Wirthlins did not
constitute an interference with plaintiffs' contract rights.
14.

There being no breach of a contractual duty, the

issue of damages was not considered.
DATED this

/ / -day of September, 1984.
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BRYANT/ H. CROFT
District Judge (Retired)
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THIS ACatOiEWT, ©ntared into thia 7th day of July, 1»?5, by and
between valley Hhoooinq Center Aaslciates

of felt !**• County.

State of Utah, hereinafter referred to aa

•Valley*

end

NOtottN CONSTRUCTtON COMPANY, of Salt U k e County, State of Utah,
hereinafter referred to aa Nomin.
MITNCSSCTlit
Valley ia deairoua of open 1 no. up a rood through froo
State Street to rairbourne Street.
Horman owne a parcel of land located immediately north of the Valley
Shopping Center building runninq eaaterly to fairbourna Street.
morman hereby agrees to deed to Hurray City the south etrip of
thia land 35 feet wide run run? east and west approximately 4S0 feet.
Property Management owns .\h* Valley Shopping Center located **"f'7* ^UA'G
immediately aouth of the fioman property and the American Motors

A

,

property and Valley Shopping Center agree* to alao deed a 15 feet
vide atrip of land running free* State Street on the vest to Fairbourne on the eaat auiking a 50 foot right-of-way for a rood froo
State Street tnrough to Fairbourna.
It ia also understood that Prooerty Management will obtain a deed
from American Motors.

Herein American Hotors will deed 35 foot

of the south r-nd of their property running from State Street oaet
to the Horman property.

Thus permitting a thoroughfare through

from State Street easterly to Fairbourne.
It ia understood between both parties hereto that Property Management and or Valley Shopping Center, Aseoc. will permit Herman or
lta assigns wit'i parking privileges for Morman or Horman invitees -4 «,i^„
to park on the park*nq lot in the rear of the Valley Shopping Center
in any of the stalls which arc used for public marking.
It is aired by both parties hereto that each party M a mold onto

m

the other party $10.00 and other n?ood r*d valuable consideration,

f>

a recoup of whirh la hereby acknowledged.

]f

It la hereby eg rood

and undrr*tr>o(!
Gorman w
will not be renulrud to move the etroet.
dcr*tr>o»! that
that >orman

/

!/

J

*

Vafley Snopoin<? Center Associates

W>**M* CnwSTtUCTIflsl OTMPAJH •
S. H. Homan, Prvsident
• (
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FDEPOSITION
EXHIBIT

Inhibit A
Description
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WARRANTY DEED
(Special)
VALLEY SHOPPING CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership
of

Salt Lake City, Utah

CONVEY

t0

grantor
hereby

against all claiming by, through or under 11

AND VAWLANT

W. MEEKS WIRTHLIN and BETTY JO G. WIRT11LIN, h i s w i f e , as tenants in common
grantee*

of

s

*u

L ke c l L

*

y*

Utah

for the sum of

TEN DOLLARS and other good and valuable consideration
the following described tract

of land in

s a l t Lake

SQCUKRK
County,

State of Utah:

SEE ATTACHED SCHEDULE A

WITNESS, the hand
March

of said grantor

Signed in the Presence of

, this
, A . D. 19 77

day of

) J ! ^ ^
)

)
)
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )

15th

ST SPENCE CLARK,

cfeneraT Partner*

STATE OF UTAH

ss.

On the 15th day of March A. D. 1977 personally appeared before me S. SPENCE CLARK
who being by me duly sworn did say that he is a General Partner of VALLEY SHOPPING
CENTER ASSOCIATES, a Limited Partnership, and that the foregoing instrument was
signed in behalf of said Limited Partnerahip by authority of the Partnership
Agreement of said Limited Partnership, and said S. SPENCE CLARK acknowledged to
me that said Limited Partnership executed the same.
Addendum A-24
Commission Expires: 10/13/80

^> \
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at: Salt Lake City, Utah

Beginning at a point en the East line of State Street at a point South 142.48 feet
and East 906,21 feet (old deed ties would nuke this South 156.42 feet and East
917.40 feet) from the West quarter comer of Section 6, Tcwnship 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, arrf running thence North 0°05f30" East along
said East line 432.24 feet; thence North 89°51f East 572,28 feet to the center of
Fairbourne Street; thence South 0°05,30" West along the center of said Street
217.52 feet; thenoe South 89 p 51' West 165.00 feet; thenoe North 0*05'30" East
35.42 feet; thenoe South 89 0 51 f West 54.51 feet; thence South 0 # 05 , 30 n West 285.31
feet to the North line of State Highway (Project US-0144 (7);. thence North 88°16f!
Vtest along said North line 126.27 feet; thence North $9*09f West along said North
line 78.00 feet; thence North 0°05'30" East 29.78 feet; thence South 89°51' West 2
feet to the point of beginning.
Subject to a Right of Kay over the North 15 feet thereof, so long as said Right oi
Way does not conflict with the existing building.
EXCEPTING THEROTEM: Beginning at a point 1003 feet East and 188 feet North of ti
Southwest comer of the Northwest quarter of Section 6, Itwnship 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, and running thence South 14 feet; thence East 24 feet;
thenoe North 14 feet; thenoe West 24 feet to the point of beginning.
•together with a Right of Way through a 10 foot alley adjacent to said property
with ingress and egress to and from the same and for the laying of pipes undernea'
the surface.
This conveyance la made and accepted subject to a Trust Deed in favor of PACIFIC
MUTUAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY recorded January 26, 1967 in Book 2525 at Page 473
of Official Records, having an unpaid principal balance of $423,329.92 as of
March 1, 1977.
This conveyance is also made and accepted subject to a Performance Mortgage in fav
of MURRAY CITY CORPORATION recorded November 22, 1976 in Book 4412 at page 394 of
Official Records.
Subject to easements, covenants, restrictions, rights of way, encroachments and
reservations appearing of record or enforceable In lav or equity and taxes for
the year 1977 and thereafter.

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-6 (1953):
Recording necessary to impart notice —
Operation and effect — Interest of person not
named in instrument. Every conveyance of real
estate, and every instrument of writing setting
forth an agreement to convey any real estate or
whereby any real estate may be affected, to
operate as notice to third persons shall be
proved or acknowledged and certified in the
manner prescribed by this title and recorded in
the office of the recorder of the county in which
such real estate is situated, but shall be valid
and binding between the parties thereto without
such proofs, acknowledgement, certification or
record, and as to all other persons who have had
actual notice. Neither the fact that an
instrument, recorded as herein provided, recites
only a nominal consideration, nor the fact that
the grantee in such instrument is designated as
trustee, or that the conveyance otherwise
purports to be in trust without naming the
beneficiaries or stating the terms of the trust,
shall operate to charge any third person with
notice of the interest of any person or persons
not named in such instrument or of the grantor or
grantors; but the grantee may convey the fee or
such lesser interest as was conveyed to him by
such instrument free and clear of all claims not
disclosed by the instrument or by an instrument
recorded as herein provided setting forth the
names of the beneficiaries, specifying the
interest claimed and describing the property
charged with such interest.

Addendum A-26

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-12 (1953):

Form of warranty deed — Effect. Conveyances of
land may be substantially in the following form:
WARRANTY DEED
(here insert name),
grantor, of
(insert place of
residence), hereby conveys and warrants to
(insert name), grantee, of
(insert place of residence), for the sum of
dollars, the following described
tract
of land in
County,
Utah to wit: (here describe the premises).
Witness the hand of grantor this
of
19 .

day

Such deed when executed as required by law
shall have the effect of a conveyance in fee
simple to the grantee, his heirs and assigns, of
the premises therein named, together with all the
appurtenances, rights and privileges thereunto
belonging, with convenants from the grantor, his
heirs and personal representatives, that he is
lawfully seised of the premises; that he has good
right to convey the same; that he guarantees the
grantee, his heirs and assigns in the quiet
possession thereof; that the premises are free
from all encumbrances; and that the grantor, his
heirs and personal representatives will forever
warrant and defend the title thereof in the
grantee, his heirs and assigns against all lawful
claims whatsoever. Any exceptions to such
covenants may be briefly inserted in such deed
following the description of the land.

Addendum A-27

SUFFOLK AND NANTUCKET.
EDWARD ADAMS

versus WILLIAM CUDDY.

Tbe owner of a tract of land in Boston conveyed a portion of it, describing suck
portion by metes and bounds ; subsequently, he ei ecu ted another deed, conveying
" ail the right and title to the land I have in Boston/' to a second grantee, which
was registered before the pnor deed. It was held, that the portion of land described
in the prior deed did not pass to the second grantee, as coming within the general
description of the estate con\eyed in the subsequent deed.
In an action between parties claiming respectively under a prior deed containing
covenants of seisin and warranty, and a subsequent deed which was registered first,
not containing any covenant, it was held, that the grantor, whose ongiual title was
good and indefeasible, was a competent witness to prove that the subsequent granlee bad notice of the pnor conveyance.
If a grantee takes with notice of a prior unregistered deed, and conveys to a second
grantee with like notice, the second grantee, as well as the first, is precluded from
setting up the subsequent deed against the pnor unregistered deed.

TRESPASS quart clausum. The defendant pleaded soil
and freehold in himself; and issue was taken on that fact.
Upon a case stated it appeared, that the locus in quo was
parcel of a larger tract of land in South Boston, which was
set off to Sarah Baker, wife of William Baker, upon the
division of the estate of her father, James Blake, deceased,
and that both parties claim title from her.
On December 21, 1807, William Baker executed a deed
with covenants of seisin and warranty, purporting to convey
the locus in quo to Jonathan Simonds in fee, and describing
it accurately by metes and bounds. The wife of Baker joined in the deed, according to the following clause : " In witness whereof I the said William Baker, and my wife, in
consideration of one dollar paid to me by said Simonds, do
forever quit my right and fee in said premises, and we have
hereto set our hands and seals," &c. This deed was not
recorded till June 3, 1803. On June 17, 1808, Simonds
conveyed the same land to the plaintiff, and the deed wis
recorded on the sane day.
On March 24, 1808, William Baker and wife executed
• deed to William^ father, Allen Baker, containing the following clauses, to wit: " I, William Baker &c. and Sarah
Baker, my wife, in her right, for in consideration of six hundred dollars paid me by my honored father, Allen Baker & c ,
I do, by these presents, the receipt acknowledge, and release

Addendum A-28

MARCH TERM 1833.

461

and forever quitclaim all the right and title to the land I have Adams
in South Boston, so called, fonnerly a part of the estate Cuddy.
of James Blake, housewright, deceased : — And I, Sarah
Baker, for myself, for the above sum mentioned do, for myself, forever release and forever quitclaim all my right and
title to my honored father aforesaid, together with my right
of dower, the receipt whereof we do hereby acknowledge,
grant, bargain, sell and convey unto our honored father aforesaid, to him, his heirs " &c. This deed contained no covenant. It was recorded on March 28, 1808.
On the decease of Allen Baker, Rebecca Baker, his widow, was appointed administratrix of his estate, and being
duly authorized to sell his real estate, for the payment of his
debts, conveyed to Calvin Baker, by a deed dated March
20, 1818, and recorded the next day, all the interest of the
deceased in a certain tract of land in South Boston, described
by metes and bounds. This tract was a portion of the land
let off to Sarah Baker and included the locus in quo. Calvin Baker, by a deed dated November 8, 1821, and recorded the next day, conveyed the same tract to the defendant.
The depositions of William and Sarah Baker, who were
both living at the time of the supposed trespass, were put
into the case, for the purpose of showing, that at the time
when they conveyed to Allen Baker, he had notice of the
prior deed to Simonds.
It was agreed, that if the plaintiff was entitled to recover,
the defendant should be defaulted, and judgment rendered for
the plaintiff for 30 dollars damages and costs ; otherwise the
plaintiff was to become nonsuit.
The case was argued in writing by D. A. Simmons, for
the plaintiff, and Rand and Fiske, for the defendant.
SHAW C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court. The ^ a r c * IW
question between these parties is a question of title only, it
being admitted that the defendant has done acts, which if
he cannot justify on the ground of title, amount to a trespass
The first question is, upon the effect of the deed of William Baker and wife to Simonds. It is certainly a very imperfect, illiterate, and ill drawn conveyance. It is contended, that there are no words of grant or conveyance on the
39*

SUFFOLK AND NANTUCKET.
part of the wife ; and this certainly seems to be the case, if,
according to the natural and grammatical construction of the
language, the words are those of the husband only. But
we do not consider that the Court is called on to decide
what quantum of estate passed by this deed. If any estate
passed and that continued till the time of the alleged trespass, it is sufficient for this action.
The husband was seised in right of his wife. It does not
appear by the facts, whether there were children of the marriage ; if there were, the husband had an inchoate tenancy
by the curtesy, which was an estate for his own life ; but
if there were not, he had a freehold, determinable upon the
contingency of surviving his wife. In either way of considering it, he had a seisin ; and such estate as he had passed by his deed to his grantee. It appears by the depositions
in the case, that William Baker and his wife were both liv*
ing, when the supposed trespass was committed, and therefore that the plaintiff had a title at that time sufficient to
enable him to maintain the action.
But another ground of defence more confidently relied
upon, is, that before the above deecf was registered, the same
estate was conveyed to Allen Baker, father of William,
through whom the defendant claims, without notice of the
prior conveyance, and the subsequent deed was first registered ; and so that the defendant has the better title ; and
the dates of the execution and registry of the respective
deeds would seem to maintain this ground.
To this the plaintiff makes two answers, first, that the subsequent deed from William Baker and wife, to his father Allen
Baker, did not include the land before conveyed to Simonds;
and secondly, that Allen Baker, the grantee, had notice of
the prior conveyance to Simonds.
That the administratrix of Allen Baker supposed that
the deed from William to his father embraced the premises,
is manifest from the fact, that she included that parcel in
her deed to Calvin Baker, made in pursuance of a sale under
a license ; and Calvin Baker, in like manner, included it in
his deed to the defendant. But if the estate did not vest in
Allen Baker, then his administratrix had no authority to

M A R C H T E R M 1833.
convey it, wd her deed was void. And the Court are all
of opinion, that the deed of William Baker and wife to his
father, did not embrace the premises. This deed is quite
AS illiterate and informal, as the one above remarked upon.
It is however, the deed of William Baker and his wife, and
all the clauses of grant and release, are die language of both,
and bind the estate of both ; and informal as it is, it is to have
its legal effect. The deed contains no covenants, of any
kind. The words, " grant, bargain, sell and convey," are
contained, but they come after the description, the words
preceding it being " release and quitclaim." But without
placing any reliance upon these informalities, we rest our
opinion upon this ; that examining the deed most critically,
it does not purport to convey any land specifically, but only
44
all the right and title to the land I have in South Boston,
formerly a part of the estate of James Blake, housewright,
deceased " ; and then afterwards the wife adds, " all my right
and utle to my honored father aforesaid " ; probably the word
44
estate " of her father's was omitted by mistake. Now, we
think the effect of conveying all the right and title I have,
by fair construction, means all that has come to me and that
1 have not legally parted with. But the deed to Simonds,
whether registered or not, gave a good title as against the
grantor and his heirs. This therefore he had legally parted
with, and it did not come within the general description of
the estate conveyed. Were it construed otherwise, the grantors might in effect commit a fraud, without intending or even
being conscious of it. Where a grantee takes by so indefinite a description as the right which the grantor has, he must
take the risk of his grantor's right.
But upon the other ground, we are strongly inclined to
the opinion, that the plaintiff has the better tide. W e do
not perceive, that William Baker and Sarah Baker were
not competent witnesses. In the deed to his father, there
is no covenant. In that to Simonds there are covenants of
seisin and warranty. It is agreed, that William Baker and
his wife were then seised and had a good and indefeasible
title. Shoujd^Simonds or his grantee lose their title in consequence of not registering their deed, the warrantor would"

461
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SUFFOLK AND NANTUCKET.
not be liable on his warranty for such_d$kcL~-There seems
^ e no case in which Baker can be liable on his warranty;
and if so, he is disinterested and a competent witness.
The effect of his testimony is, that when he conveyed to
his father, the latter had notice of his prior conveyance to
Simonds. If such was the case, he could never set up his
title, though his deed was first registered, against the prior
unregistered deed to Simonds. And though if Calvin Baker and the defendant had taken a deed from Allen, without notice of such defect in his title, the title might be indefeasible in them, yet this principle would not apply here,
as they did not take a deed of him, but of his administratrix,
who could only sell such estate as he had. But what is
more important, before the defendant took his deed of Calvin Baker or the latter t k his of the administratrix, the
deeds from William Baker to Simonds and from the latter
.0 the plaintiff, had been recorded ; which was constructive
notice to them. Now I take the rule to be, that if a grantee takes with notice of a prior unregistered deed, and he
conveys to a second grantee, with like notice, the second,
&> well as the first, is precluded from setting up the subsequent deed, against the prior unregistered deed.
Defendant defaulted
t0

